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Most scientists are well aware of the need to
guard against potential sources of pressure
toward bias, particularly when work is con-
ducted in contexts of litigation and regula-
tion, but it is not clear that the usual sources
of concern are actually those that are most
important. In this article, I argue that,
although overt pressures to slant ﬁndings may
well be problematic, more attention needs to
be devoted to the insidious but potentially
more signiﬁcant pressures toward bias that go
largely unnoticed, often because they come
from unseen or unexpected directions.
I present the argument in four main sec-
tions: In the ﬁrst I discuss my experience on a
scientiﬁc review panel, illustrating that poten-
tial sources of bias in science are more complex
than is often assumed. In the second section I
discuss that experience and this article’s larger
points in the context of existing professional
literature on the topic, noting that the litera-
ture offers valuable contributions but also
includes important oversights and omissions.
The third main section illustrates this point by
drawing on another, more recent experience,
in which I was able to observe ﬁrst-hand one
of the ways in which a major multinational
corporation was actively seeding the scientiﬁc
literature. Finally, the fourth and closing sec-
tion offers an initial or draft typology of key
ways in which the unseen sources of potential
bias may be considerably more signiﬁcant than
those that are seen and/or actively resisted.
Biases—Seen and Unseen
The committees of the National Academy
of Sciences/National Research Council
(NAS/NRC) generally begin with closed-door
sessions, in which committee members are
asked to disclose and discuss their sources of
bias or conflicts of interest, including any
business, research, or other interests or posi-
tions that might be perceived by outside
observers as creating a potential for a conﬂict
of interest. As NAS staffers commonly
explain, the most knowledgeable scientists
available on many issues also happen to be the
ones who have worked and published exten-
sively on the topics in question, so the inten-
tion is not to exclude all scientists who might
have strong viewpoints. Instead, the goal is to
have a balance of viewpoints and experiences
and to discuss openly any such potential
sources of bias, real or perceived, at the outset.
Safeguards such as these are laudable, but
as indicated by the literature discussed in the
next section of this article, they are also incom-
plete. One of the reasons is illustrated by a bias
discussion that occurred in connection with a
relatively recent NAS/NRC review of the
scientiﬁc basis for a proposed low-level radio-
active waste facility in the northeastern United
States. One after another, the new committee
members discussed previous work they had
performed for the nuclear industry—and
then announced a complete absence of bias,
generally doing so with considerable feeling.
Two points about these self-assessments
were particularly notable. First, in comparison
with the agonizing and painstaking way in
which social scientists usually discuss potential
sources of bias, the self-assessments were char-
acterized by a remarkable absence of reflec-
tion, sensitivity, or in some cases, evidently
even awareness of the appearance of potential
conflicts, even though the assessments were
being offered by scientists who were otherwise
highly perceptive. One scientist announced
with total conviction, for example, that no
one could possibly accuse him of having any
biases about the site we were about to review,
because he was the top manager for a different
low-level nuclear waste site—one that was
about a hundred miles away, in the next state.
Another announced that, although he had
spent some 30 years working in or as a consul-
tant for the nuclear industry—always for orga-
nizations that produced nuclear wastes and/or
needed to dispose of them—at least 5 years
had passed since he had done any work for the
specific nuclear contracting companies that
happened to be involved with the speciﬁc site
we were being asked to review. Still another
reported that although she had worked exten-
sively for the U.S. Department of Energy—
the federal agency with lead responsibility for
disposing of high-level nuclear waste—that
background had absolutely no relevance to a
review of a document that was intended to
facilitate the development of a site for low-
level nuclear wastes.
So it went, around the table. By the time
the discussion had ended, 13 members of the
committee—including me—disclosed that we
had done work for the companies that gener-
ated or attempted to dispose of nuclear waste.
Only three members—again including me—
had done work for the communities, states, or
nongovernmental organizations that were
opposed to nuclear facilities in their areas.
In the most diplomatic tones possible, I
raised the issue of the appearance of balance. I
assured my colleagues that, in the process of
working with them, I was already learning to
have great respect for their intelligence and
integrity. Still, I reminded them, the key issue
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7 November 2007]in the end would have to do with our com-
mittee’s credibility—particularly in the eyes
of people who, unlike those of us in the room
that day, would not have the opportunity to
become acquainted with the committee mem-
bers in person.
This was no minor issue. The site faced
intense opposition—much of it animated by
claims that previous work on the repository
had been performed by agencies and consul-
tants having far more commitment to the
nuclear industry than to fair or balanced sci-
ence. If that original work were to be given a
clean bill of health by a committee consisting
largely of persons with long histories of
employment in that same nuclear industry,
the net result might do more to damage the
credibility of the committee, and possibly the
NRC itself, than to improve the credibility of
the work being reviewed.
Several other members of the committee
shared this concern, and several did not, but the
conversation only became heated at the next
step, when we tried to identify potential com-
mittee members who might have as much cred-
ibility in the eyes of industry opponents as the
initial committee members could be expected
to have in the eyes of nuclear industry support-
ers. Although several of the potential candidates
were exceptionally well-qualiﬁed scientists, vir-
tually all were denounced, most with a level of
passion that bordered on ferocity. A typical ver-
dict—offered with a memorable sneer, and
with a degree of scorn that goes well beyond
what the printed word can convey—was that
Professor X was “one of those ‘anti’ types.”
Most other potential candidates for the com-
mittee were denounced with similar intensity,
and the end result was that committee’s com-
position, although far from being balanced,
remained completely unchanged.
In the end, fortunately, the committee
managed to finish its work without creating
credibility problems for the NAS/NRC. No
small part of the reason was that the commit-
tee genuinely did carry out its work in a fair
and balanced manner, although another part
of the reason had to do with the speciﬁc con-
clusions reached. As the committee looked
into the methods and calculations that had
led to the proposed waste site, signs of
increasingly serious errors came to light, and
ultimately, the committee unanimously
endorsed a report that was highly critical.
Although we found no evidence of evil or
malicious intent, the ﬁnal report clearly indi-
cated that the committee saw the analysis and
conclusions as fatally ﬂawed.
Both halves of that committee’s experi-
ences are directly relevant for understanding
the pressures on science in contexts of litigation
and regulation. On the one hand, the scientists
on that committee—like most others—truly
did think of themselves, with good reason, as
being scrupulously fair and balanced, and they
would have rebuffed, vigorously, any overt
efforts to buy or bias their conclusions. At the
same time, however, that committee’s mem-
bers—almost certainly including me—also
shared with other scientists a significantly
lower level of ability to recognize, let alone to
resist, potential sources of bias that are harder
to detect.
A comparable pattern is evident in the com-
mon story about a boxer who loses a match not
so much because he let his guard down, but
because a punch came from an unexpected
direction, and he “didn’t see it coming.” For
science in contexts of litigation and regulation,
it may well be important to focus not just on
the obvious ways in which scientists need to be
careful of not letting down our scientiﬁc guard,
but also on the more subtle, gradual, yet per-
haps ultimately more powerful ways in which
bias can creep into scientiﬁc thinking and con-
clusions, precisely because even the best-inten-
tioned of scientists can fail to see it coming.
After a brief review of the academic literature
that has emerged on this point, I examine the
issue with greater specificity, illustrating the
potential dangers by using another ﬁrst-hand
experience that gave me an opportunity to
observe such a process at work.
Past Literature
For readers who are not already familiar with
existing analyses of relationships between eco-
nomic interests and science, a useful starting
point is to recognize that the possibilities are
generally considered worrisome, not reassur-
ing. Although relatively few concerns are
raised in some subsets of the existing litera-
ture, such as the classic or Mertonian tradi-
tion in the sociology of science—where most
authors would see corporate intrusions into
the orderly progress of science as being inap-
propriate but relatively rare [see e.g., Merton
(1973)]—the more common patterns involve
expressions of concern (Dietz et al. 1989;
Freudenburg 1996; Gieryn 1983; Kinchy and
Kleinman 2005; Krimsky 2000; Lawless
1993; Molotch 1970).
Much of the attention has focused on rela-
tively straightforward ethical considerations,
such as the problems of potentially tainted
sources of funding for scientiﬁc laboratories, or
the ways in which an interest in product com-
mercialization might inﬂuence applied research,
in terms of either overstating beneﬁts or steer-
ing away from consideration of potential draw-
backs and risks (Kleinman 1995; Kloppenburg
1988; Levins and Lewontin 1985). One of the
most commonly noted and readily understood
problems, for example, involves cases where
corporate interests have sought to keep unfavor-
able evidence from coming to public attention
or to undermine the legitimacy of more critical
work (Dietz et al. 1989; Krimsky 2000; Martin
1999; Rosner and Markowitz 1985). Other
analyses, however, have pointed to problems
that are less overt. In an analysis of logging on
public lands, notably, Hirt (1994) identiﬁed a
long-standing pattern that he called a “conspir-
acy of optimism,” involving estimates about the
rate at which new trees would grow up to
replace the ones removed by logging. My col-
leagues and I have referred to a comparable pat-
tern in less colorful language, calling attention
instead to what we have called the “asymmetry
of scientiﬁc challenge” [see e.g., Freudenburg
(2001); Freudenburg and Gramling (2002);
and Freudenburg and Youn (1999)].
As Hirt (1994) noted, such patterns may
be especially likely when the relevant govern-
ment agencies have come to see their interests
as being shared with those of an organized
industry, as in the case of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the nuclear power industry,
or of the U.S. Forest Service and the logging
industry (Clarke 1985; Martin 1999). In
recent years, however, a similar problem has
been identified in biomedical or health-
related research. As noted by Brownlee
(2004), there have been growing concerns
about potential biases in these fields, due in
part to the fact that private funding of drug
trials has grown so spectacularly—from $26
million in 1984 to $2.3 billion in the year
2000—with 60% of the clinical trials now
being funded by biomedical companies rather
than by the government.
In a pattern with an uncomfortable simi-
larity to Hirt’s “conspiracy of optimism,” one
of the most striking implications of this trend
has involved what Brownlee (2004) calls
“happy talk” about medical products. In one
case, for example, Pﬁzer, the manufacturer of
the prescription painkiller Celebrex, sup-
ported a study comparing that drug against
the over-the-counter medicines ibuprofen and
aspirin. The results of a massive 6-month
study that favored Celebrex were published in
the prestigious Journal of the American
Medical Association (Silverstein et al. 2000).
By contrast, when the final year-long study
led to less cheerful findings—showing the
sponsor’s painkiller to be associated with
more gastrointestinal side effects and 3 times
as high a level of serious heart problems than
the over-the-counter medicine ibuprofen—
those results were never published at all. By
the end of 2004, the National Cancer
Institute halted a Celebrex trial because high
doses of the drug were linked to a tripling of
cardiovascular problems—a pattern that
Pfizer called “unexpected,” even though one
of Pﬁzer’s own studies had suggested compa-
rable problems (Henderson 2005). As these
words were written, Celebrex was the only
one of the so-called Cox-2 inhibitors still on
the market in the United States, with others
having been removed under a cloud of legal
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“expression of concern” in the New England
Journal of Medicine about evident withhold-
ing of data on heart attacks related to another
Cox-2 drug, Vioxx (Curfman et al. 2005;
Girion 2005).
In his more extensive assessment of bio-
medical research, involving more than 60,000
articles from more than 175 journals, Krimsky
(2003) found that this pattern may not be an
isolated one. In fact, only 0.5% of the authors
revealed potential conflicts of interest, even
though roughly a quarter of biomedical
researchers were receiving industry funding at
the time. Another assessment—a meta-analysis
in the Journal of the American Medical
Association by Bekelman et al. (2003), pulling
together results from eight other articles that
collectively assessed a total of 1,140 studies—
found additional support for the “happy talk”
hypothesis, namely, a clear and statistically sig-
niﬁcant association between industry sponsor-
ship and pro-industry conclusions. Bekelman
et al. (2003) also found that roughly a quarter
of investigators had industry afﬁliations, that
roughly two-thirds of those investigators’ aca-
demic institutions held equity in startup com-
panies that sponsored research being done at
the same institutions, and that industry spon-
sorship was clearly associated with restrictions
on publications and data sharing.
The Internal Compass and the
Golden Rule
These and other assessments show that there
is a certain degree of legitimacy in the usual
concern, which has to do with what might be
called the cynical version of the Golden
Rule—those who have the gold make the
rules. At this point, however, I return to a
first-person account—one that starts by
acknowledging that this usual concern was
also the ﬁrst one that occurred to me when I
had an unexpected opportunity to gain ﬁrst-
hand insights into the potential pitfalls of liti-
gation-related research [for a more extensive
discussion, see Freudenburg (2005)]. On the
basis of what I learned from my own experi-
ences, I now see other concerns as more wor-
risome, and I attempt to illustrate here the
reasons why that is so.
In essence, my ﬁrst worry at the time was
that I might be agreeing to a Faustian bar-
gain—selling my scientiﬁc soul, with the role
of the devil being played by company lawyers
who in the end would tell me what to pub-
lish. What I experienced, I now believe, was
just the opposite—not that the corporation
ever put strong or even mild pressure on me
to publish something with which I would be
uncomfortable, but instead, consistent praise
for the fact that they considered me to be
such a principled, credible scientist. The
problem I failed to see, at the time, involved
the temptation to start changing my own
judgments, in far more subtle ways, in
response to their repeated insistence that it
was precisely my independence and scientiﬁc
credibility that they valued.
It all began when I picked up the tele-
phone. At the other end was a gentleman I
had not previously known but who worked
for a company I knew reasonably well. Over
the next several months, he and the experi-
ence would teach me a good deal more about
one of the ways in which economic interests
might influence the course of science—one
that had never before occurred to me or, for
that matter, to even the most radical and con-
spiratorially oriented of my students. Given
that I had conducted extensive ﬁeldwork and
had the habit of recording my notes on a
hand-held tape recorder, I followed the same
instincts after this telephone call, and there is
no better place to start the reporting of what I
learned than with the notes I recorded then:
I just got off the telephone with [identifying refer-
ence]. He was calling me in conjunction with [his
company’s] appeal of the punitive damage awards
in [a lawsuit]. . . . [H]e said, he wanted to see if I
might be interested in writing an article that [his
company] would be able to use as part of its
appeal of the punitive damages in the case. As he
put it (the following is as close as I can get to a
verbatim recording of his remarks from just a few
minutes ago):
Naturally, we have a range of expert witnesses and
so forth, but we ﬁnd that it’s also helpful to have
people working on articles that come out in acade-
mic publications. We’ve often worked with econo-
mists, for example. A lot of them feel that punitive
damage awards are very inefficient, compared to
other approaches such as regulation, and naturally,
that’s a perspective we’re quite comfortable in sup-
porting. But we’re exploring whether we might
want to work with professors in publishing things
from a few other perspectives, too. . . . 
Basically, what we’re exploring is whether it’s fea-
sible to get something published in a respectable
academic journal, talking about what punitive
damage awards do to society, or how they’re not
really a very good approach. Then, in our appeal,
we can cite the article, and note that professor so-
and-so has said in this academic journal, preferably
a quite prestigious one, that punitive awards don’t
make much sense.
At this point, he and I spent some time
exploring various possibilities that might be of
interest both to me and to his company. By
the end of this conversation, I was greatly
intrigued, but also ambivalent. I had qualms
about doing this form of consulting work,
but I found that my qualms were calmed
enough—both through ongoing interactions
with this caller and through learning what it
was that I was or was not asked to do—that
those qualms never became a real roadblock.
In essence, I proposed only those topics that I
would feel comfortable in turning into
journal submissions, leaving to him and his
company the question of what to support and
pursue. Similarly, although he suggested sev-
eral topics to me, he never pressured me to
take on a topic that seemed to me to be inap-
propriate. Powerfully counterbalancing the
ambivalence, at the same time, was the fact
that I was very curious to learn more. From
the notes:
I was exploring something I still don’t fully com-
prehend, save perhaps at a strictly intellectual
level—how it is that a company as big as [his]
would actually want to pay a sociologist for doing
something that we normally think of as providing
a useful example of the word “obscure”—publish-
ing in an academic journal—and what good it
could possibly do them. . . .
Part of the answer on “what good it could
do them” had to do with the dynamics of the
appeals process. At the level of an initial or
jury trial, the caller explained, academic arti-
cles would have relatively little value for his
company—a judgment he based in part on
research by another one of his company’s con-
sultants. As he summarized that research, ordi-
nary jurors tend to be swayed by nonfactual
considerations, including the fact that it is eas-
ier to sympathize with “little guy” victims than
with a massive corporation such as his, but
also, he insisted, “by a kind of lottery mental-
ity . . . they (the jurors) think that ‘next time,
that could be me’”—the lucky person who
might enjoy a windfall of a similarly huge jury
verdict. “Once it gets to the judges,” on the
other hand, he said, “you start to have a better
shot. . . . With the judges, there’s at least a rea-
sonably good chance that they’ll be able to see
things as they ought to be.”
As the process was unfolding, I asked
myself the kinds of ethical questions that will
occur to many readers of this article. In the
end, I wound up concluding in each case that
I was in fact proceeding in a scientifically
appropriate, ethical way. In retrospect, how-
ever, I believe that I was so focused on avoid-
ing overt pressures to state predetermined
conclusions that I missed what is now the
main point of the present article—I failed to
recognize the power of more subtle forms of
inﬂuence. To be more speciﬁc, I was initially
worried mainly about an issue that has been
raised, eloquently, by one of the reviewers of
this article, who argued in his/her review that
scientists should establish “a strong rule of
thumb: Don’t create academic literature
under contract.” At least from that reviewer’s
perspective, there is a clear difference between
research sponsorship versus preparation of
journal articles under contract, because
“sponsorship should not allow them [the cor-
porate sponsors] to censor what the researcher
writes.” At the outset, my main worry had to
do with this very possibility—the potential
that the corporate sponsors might try to cen-
sor what I wished to write. As events
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went out of their way to avoid doing anything
I might have interpreted as raising even vague
hints of censorship—and yet in the end, that
did not prevent the relationship from having
a far greater inﬂuence over my thinking and
writing than I believe I was able to recognize
at the time.
My thinking at the time is perhaps best-
illustrated by an excerpt from ﬁeld notes that,
with the benefits of hindsight, I now see as
being insufﬁciently self-critical or thoughtful,
even though I remember seeing myself as hav-
ing been concerned with balance when I
wrote these words:
I must admit, I have quite a complex set of reac-
tions at the moment. Part of me is deeply bothered
by the fact that this sort of thing is going on—at
all—let alone by the fact that I might become part
of it. Another part of me—the middle-of-the-road
part—is tapping me on the shoulder, reminding me
that I’ve always said I try to be a straight shooter, I
call them as I see them, and whether it’s [his com-
pany, or his company’s] sworn enemies, if they can
use my stuff, ﬁne, and if not, that’s their choice. . . .
I see a clear potential for ethical quagmires and
quicksand, of the bottomless-pit variety, but I
guess at least for the moment, so long as I con-
tinue to be worried about those questions, there’s
at least some reasonable hope that I’ll continue to
learn more, while not completely selling my
soul. . . . I guess I simply need to remain true to
my ethnographic principles, but also my
researcher principles . . . performing a remarkable
balancing act at the same time—giving [his com-
pany] a quality product for the money . . . while
not sending anything off to a peer-reviewed jour-
nal that I’m not comfortable signing my name to.
Soon after that, his company flew me
down to their headquarters for a face-to-face
meeting. At that meeting, I remember saying
to them that, although I had written some
articles that would warm their hearts and oth-
ers that would be more likely to bring them
heartburn, the ones they had in front of them
before I arrived were mostly of the “heart-
burn” variety. Under the circumstances, I
wondered, why had they invited me down
anyway? Their answer, offered without hesita-
tion: “How do you suppose we could find
somebody credible who hasn’t said some criti-
cal things about us?” That response, and the
good-natured way in which it was presented,
did a good deal to put me at ease, as did the
congenial tone of our conversations more
broadly. They made it clear that day—and
reinforced the point in many ways in subse-
quent interchanges—that they had absolutely
no intention of censoring my work. They
never did censor my work, or even drop
vague hints that they might be so inclined.
Instead, they emphasized repeatedly that they
saw me as the kind of principled, indepen-
dent scientist who could never be swayed by
nonscientiﬁc factors such as threats or dollars.
The problem seems to have been that, each
time they offered such assurances, I came to
believe them more.
By the end of that visit, we agreed that we
would examine several different possibilities,
and that I would work to develop one or
more of those ideas for an article. Over the
next several weeks, I did in fact develop sev-
eral outlines for potential article submissions.
The one that the company found most inter-
esting had to do with some thoughts I had
already “been thinking about writing up some
day,” arguing that the adversarial approaches
of the legal system ran precisely counter to the
prescriptions for sensible risk management
that were beginning to emerge from the liter-
ature on risk analysis and risk management at
the time. In essence, although adversarial pro-
cedures encourage secrecy, the ﬁndings from
the literature on “highly reliable organiza-
tions” were beginning to suggest the impor-
tance of “organizational permeability” and
other forms of openness, for improving orga-
nizational performance in general and risk
management in particular (Clarke 1993;
LaPorte 1996; LaPorte and Keller 1996;
Shrader-Frechette 1993). I did a quick write-
up of a draft paper and sent it to my contact
at the company.
Neither my contact nor anyone else at his
company expressed any strongly negative
reactions, although at least one of the com-
pany’s lawyers did point out later that more
openness could be bothersome for his corpo-
ration—it could increase the number of peo-
ple who would know enough about the
company to be able to sue it. The larger prob-
lem, as my contact ultimately explained to
me—in an explanation that I believe to have
been genuine—simply came down to the
value of my argument to his company. He
thought the article would be “nice,” he said,
but it would not really help their case enough
to be worth spending the additional dollars
that would be required, at my consulting rate,
to turn it from a draft into a published article.
I stress again at this point that, far from
raising any hints about censorship at that
time, he made a point of encouraging me to
submit the article to a journal if I wished to
do so—his was a concern not about the con-
tent of the paper, but about paying me to
work on it. At the time, I remember thinking
that his reaction was similar to a rating of
“good” on a grant proposal to the National
Science Foundation: Even if a reviewer might
check the box that says, “Fund this proposal if
resources are plentiful,” few scientists have
ever encountered cases where resources are
that plentiful. I need to add that my own
evaluation was not that different from his:
Even after all these years, I still have not
invested the time that would be needed to
rewrite that draft paper and submit it to a
journal. It remains buried in a file cabinet,
and unless I encounter some new reason to
revise and reﬁne that early draft paper, it may
ultimately be less likely to go into a journal
than to go into university recycling bins.
We did discuss other possible article top-
ics before parting company, but my reactions
to his suggestions were no more enthusiastic
than were his reactions to mine, in large part
because his company was interested in articles
concluding that punitive damages were irra-
tional and “out of control,” and the actual
research ﬁndings on that point tended not to
support their preferred conclusion [see e.g.,
Eisenberg (2001) and Galanter (1983)]. After
a few more conversations, but in quite a cor-
dial fashion, we agreed to a parting of ways.
He closed by reminding me that he fully
intended to pay me for the hours I had put
in, and I reassured myself that I had indeed
remained true to my principles, because I
never did allow the potential for income to
tempt me into writing something that I felt to
be inconsistent with the available evidence.
Discussion
Most readers of this article are likely to be
familiar the old story about the boiling frog—
the observation that a frog will leap out
immediately if it is dropped into a cauldron
of boiling water, but that it might not even
notice (and might thus boil to death) being
placed into cool water that is warmed up only
gradually. That, however, may not be quite
the right metaphor. The larger problem,
instead, may have to do with needing to ask
how we can see what it is that we fail to see.
Part of the answer may lie in being able to
think more carefully about the reasons for
failing to see something. Just as a magician
can make things seem to disappear by getting
the audience to focus on something else
(Freudenburg and Alario 2007), part of the
answer may be that it may be easier to inﬂu-
ence scientists’ thinking by praising their
independence than by seeking to limit it.
Based in part on the ﬁrst-hand experience
summarized in this article, I now rarely ques-
tion scientists who claim that they have never
been subjected to (overt) pressure to change
their findings, or that they are genuinely
proud of just how independent they (hon-
estly) believe they are. Although I believe they
are doing their best to tell the truth about
their own perceptions, however, I am less
ready to believe that those perceptions will
offer completely reliable information about
their actual levels of scientiﬁc impartiality. The
concern in some ways parallels the issue of
“gifts of nominal value”—a speciﬁc and spe-
cialized quotation that nevertheless generated
more than 32,000 “hits” in a Google search
performed August 2007. By far, the majority
of the “top” hits endorsed the appropriateness
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greater economic value. As noted in a biomed-
ical context by Kupersanin (2002), however,
“many studies have shown that even minor
gifts have an impact on clinical decisions.”
Despite this commonality, however, my con-
cerns are more speciﬁc, relating to the reason
why I am less sanguine than the reviewer
quoted above about the distinction between
corporate support for research versus corporate
support for the writing of journal articles.
Somewhat ironically, my revised reason-
ing is associated with a less cynical version of
the Golden Rule, involving the norm of reci-
procity and, more specifically, the forms of
reciprocity that do not necessarily even
involve money. If the companies that support
our scientific research are very careful to
respect what is important to us in nonﬁnan-
cial terms—namely, our objectivity and inde-
pendence—then it may seem only fair for us
to ask what we can do for them, “without
compromising” our objectivity.
In some ways, such accommodations are
little different from the ones we all make
every day, when a colleague asks for extra help
on a manuscript or a student is in extra need
of advice. In contexts of litigation and regula-
tion, however, the consequences can be much
more substantial—and as in the case of the
NAS/NRC bias discussion that I summarized
at the start of this article, the resultant drift of
scientists’ self-perceptions can have a cumula-
tive impact that is signiﬁcantly more system-
atic in one direction rather than another.
Given that self-perceptions are inherently
personalistic, I am offering this article’s warn-
ings not as hard-and-fast rules that deserve to be
seen as established but in the form of possibili-
ties that deserve closer attention in the future.
As a way of adding specificity to my overall
concerns, and potentially providing clearer
guidance for future research, Table 1 identiﬁes
ﬁve more speciﬁc categories of pressures toward
bias that may deserve greater attention. To
switch metaphors, Table 1 suggests that if it is
useful to think of science in any context as
being a hunt for truth, there are at least five
ways in which the unseen hazards or pressures
toward bias may be more insidious or more
dangerous than the overt hazards that most sci-
entists have learned to expect. The ﬁrst has to
do with each scientist’s own internal sense of
direction. The second concerns the mental
maps that tell each of us where to look. The
third involves the rules by which we believe we
are hunting, and the fourth concerns the
broader “region” or context in which we believe
we are hunting. The fifth set of pressures,
ﬁnally, pertains to the ways in which we ulti-
mately measure or assess whatever quarry we
“bag.” Of all these pressures, perhaps the ﬁfth
and ﬁnal set of pressures is the one that is in
greatest need of further discussion [see also
Freudenburg et al. (in press) and Michaels and
Monforton (2005)].
One of the potential blind spots of science
relates back to statistical training. The problem
is that, at least until very recently, few scientists
learned much about statistical power—the
likelihood of failing to recognize a pattern that
is actually present. Partly for that reason, even
well-known and careful scientists will often
emphasize that a “ﬁnding” may be statistically
significant through chance alone while over-
looking the equally true point from the other
side of the coin—the fact that even a “statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant” pattern may nevertheless be
substantively important.
A major source of the problem has to do
with the difference between “pure” and
“applied” science, although this difference,
again, is largely unrecognized. In a world of
pure science, it can be prudent to concentrate
mainly on type I errors and “significance.”
The salient risk in such work is that if scientists
are not sufficiently careful—that is, careful
about type I risks—other scientists may waste
time disproving a hypothesis that is simply a
random ﬂuke. For decisions that involve real-
world risks, on the other hand, the most
important risk may well be just the opposite
one—the risk of assuming that a chemical
compound or a technology is “safe” when in
fact it is not. At least in real-world regulatory
and/or litigation-related debates, however,
regulators rarely ask whether we know
enough to allow the public to be subjected to
unknown risks [the type II or “statistical
power” concern—see Freudenburg et al. (in
press)]. Instead, as suggested in Table 2, even
among those who have reasonably sophisti-
cated scientific training, the more common
tendency has been to ask whether the scien-
tiﬁc ﬁndings are strong enough to justify the
imposition of regulations in the absence of
deﬁnitive “proof.”
A relatively new line of work on this prob-
lem, drawing on the literature in the sociol-
ogy of science and technology, responds with
a four-part argument. First, science is capable
of offering only three kinds of answers—yes,
no, and maybe. Second, contrary to the wide-
spread assumption that science is neat and
deﬁnitive—in line instead with the common
finding in the sociology of science that it is
not—most scientiﬁc work in contexts of liti-
gation and regulation falls into the “maybe”
category. In the relatively few cases where the
evidence becomes clear enough that the par-
ties stop fighting over a given question, in
other words, the battles usually just move on
to the next questions that are still in the
“maybe” category. Third, in most real-world
cases of conﬂicts over litigation and/or regula-
tion, the net result is that victory goes to the
side that wins when the answer is “maybe.”
Fourth and ﬁnally, even well-trained scientists
are often remarkably unaware of this pattern.
The net result is a reasonably consistent (and
generally but not always helpful) scientific
tendency to do work that will permit clearer
yes/no answers—clear support or rejection of
whatever hypotheses are currently being
debated—rather than focusing on what may
be a more important question in contexts of
litigation and regulation, namely, how deci-
sions could be made more rationally and
even-handedly in the absence of just such
deﬁnitive answers.
When I began to think back to the col-
leagues on the NAS/NRC committee who
were so adamant about their freedom from
bias in assessing a low-level waste site, my ﬁrst
reaction was the one mentioned in the open-
ing pages of this article—a sense that those
colleagues were not being sufficiently
thoughtful about potential sources of bias.
Freudenburg
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Table 1. Scientists’ abilities to detect/resist “expected” versus “unexpected” sources of bias in the hunt
for truth.
Sources of bias Expected/watched for/resisted Often unseen, unresisted
Internal sense of direction Threats; overt pressure to slant Congeniality, support;
ﬁndings/conclusions compliments on neutrality
“Maps” of where to look Lawyers expected to be adversarial Lawyers good at changing questions—
(whereas science is collegial) which are more important than answers
Rules of the “hunt” Focus on “facts,” on answering Broader “frames” that shape initial
questions selection of questions
Broader region in which Economic interests may have purchased “Subsidies” to mass media from public
the hunt takes place media outlets, “bought” journalists relations ﬁrms, semi-independent 
journalists
Ways of assessing quarry “Sound science,” statistical signiﬁcance Balanced science—statistical power; 
trade-offs between type I/type II errors
Table 2. Two ways to be wrong in science.
Hypothesis: technology is safe Hypothesis: technology is risky
Reality: technology is safe Correct Type I error (usually avoided with 
95% conﬁdence)
Reality: technology is risky Type II error (rarely avoided with Correct
even 50% conﬁdence)Having spent more time reflecting on the
matter, I think today that all scientists, myself
included, may have more resemblance to the
colleagues on that committee than I originally
recognized. All of us seem to believe, with
good reason, that we do a good job of resist-
ing overt or flagrant pressures toward bias,
but such clear-cut cases may be far more rare
than we often assume. Instead, those clear-cut
cases may have more than a passing resem-
blance to simpliﬁed Hollywood villains—the
ones that wear black hats may be the easiest to
recognize, but they are rarely encountered
except in ﬁction.
At the same time, we often learn that
many of our problems and challenges are at
least partly of our own making—and partly
due to problems that we “didn’t see coming.”
A recently deceased but much-beloved col-
league used to joke that he specialized in
“pointing out the hidden assumptions in
other people’s arguments,” and of course, the
rest of us often do so as well. For the future,
on the other hand, we may all do a better job
of recognizing and dealing with threats to sci-
entific balance if we begin to devote more
attention to the ways in which scientiﬁc rigor
and balance can be undermined—in our col-
leagues and in ourselves—precisely at those
times when we see no black hats, and when
we are being praised for our balance and
integrity instead of feeling a need to defend it.
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